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En Banc Review in Federal Circuit Courts: 
A Reassessment 
A "sitting en banc"1 is a consideration of a case by all of the 
judges of a United States court of appeals.2 It is an exception to the 
1. Literally "en bane'' means "in the bench." BLACK'S LA.w DICI'IONARY 619 (rev, 
4th ed. 1968). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970). The statute provides that "[a] court in bane shall consist 
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usual procedure for review under which a case is heard by a panel 
of three judges,8 whose decision is deemed to be the decision of the 
court of appeals.4 Cases may be initially heard en bane or reviewed 
by the entire court after consideration by the three-judge panel.Ii 
of all circuit judges in regular active service. A circuit judge of the circuit who has 
retired from regular active service shall also be competent to sit as a judge of the court 
in bane in the rehearing of a case or controversy if he sat in the court or division at 
the original hearing thereof." 
Without considering the possibility that retired judges may sit en bane, the size 
of the circuit's en bane court is equal to the number of judgeships authorized for the 
circuit by Congress. The following table indicates the number of judges presently 
authorized for each circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1970): 
Circuit Number of Judges 











A bill is currently pending that would authorize additional judgeships for the courts 
of appeals. s. 2991, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The bill would increase the number of 
judgeships on the First Circuit tr;, four, the Second Circuit to eleven, the Third 
Circuit to ten, the Fourth Circuit to nine, the Sixth Circuit to ten, the Seventh Circuit 
to nine, and the Tenth Circuit to eight. 
3. See FED. R. .APP. P. 35(a). In fiscal year 1973, 730 appeals were heard by three-
judge panels of the Sixth Circuit; only 3 cases were reheard en bane during the same 
period. Letter from Hon. Harry Phillips, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Nov. 6, 1973 [hereinafter Phillips 
Letter]. Only 2 en bane hearings and I en bane rehearing were held in fiscal year 
1973 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Letter from 
Hugh E. Kline, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to 
the Michigan Law Review, Jan. 7, 1974 [hereinafter Kline Letter]. The Fifth Circuit 
heard only 24 appeals en bane during fiscal year 1973. Statement of Hon. John R. 
Brown, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, before the 
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System of the United States 
(app.), Sept. 5, 1973, on file with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Brown State-
m~t]. 
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 46(b)•(c) (1970). 
5. En bane courts may be convened in three situations. First, an en bane court 
may be employed in lieu of a three-judge panel. E.g., Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 
470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972); Cisneros v, Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 
F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973); United States v. Gustavson, 
454 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972). Second, an en bane 
court may be convened after the case has been heard by a panel but before the panel 
has announced a decision. E.g., Manley v. United States, 432 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1970); 
United States ex rel. Grays v. Rundle, 428 F,2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1970). Third, an en bane 
court may be convened after publication of a panel decision. E.g., United States v. 
Bailey, 480 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973), a/fg. on rehearing 468 F,2d 652 (5th Cir. 1972); 
Gallegos v. United States, 476 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1973), remanding on rehearing 466 
F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1972). The first situation is referred to as an en bane "hearing"; the 
last two situations are referred to as en bane "rehearings." See Maris, Hearing and Re-
hearing Cases in Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 92-96 (1953), 
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Prevailing theory justifies the use of the en bane procedure as 
promoting intra-circuit uniformity of case law through the overruling 
of aberrant panel decisions6 and as placing a maximum of judicial 
authority behind decisions of exceptionally important questions.7 
A desire to conserve judicial resources in an era of staggering judicial 
caseloads, however, has prompted several circuit courts to adopt 
limiting procedures or criteria for the use of en bane review.8 Most 
recently the Second Circuit seemed to question the traditional 
theories supporting the en bane procedure.Ii 
This Note will examine the validity of the traditional justifica-
tions for en bane review, discuss the recent circuit court attempts to 
modify the procedure, and suggest possible changes that might make 
more effective use of it. 
Two sets of factors determine when an en bane court will be 
convened. The first consists of federal cases and statutes that define 
the general procedural parameters of en bane review. The second 
includes the rules and practices evolved by the individual circuits. 
In 1948, following the Supreme Court's approval of the power to 
sit en bane in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,10 
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), which provides: 
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or 
division of not more than three judges, unless a hearing or rehearing 
before the court in bane is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges 
of the circuit who are in regular active service, A court in bane shall 
consist of all circuit judges in regular active service. A circuit judge 
of the circuit who has retired from regular active service shall also be 
competent to sit as a judge of the court in bane in the rehearing of a 
case or controversy if he sat"in the court or division at the original 
hearing thereo£.U 
The statute plainly does no more than establish a basic procedural 
6. See text accompanying notes 46-48 infra. 
7, See text accompanying notes 61-67 infra. 
8, See text accompanying notes 79-88 infra, 
9, See Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), Tevd. on other 
grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974). The Second Circuit refused to grant an 
en bane rehearing because the court believed that the Supreme Court would grant 
certiorari in the case. 479 F.2d at 1020-21. This would seem to be an abandonment of 
the "exceptionally important" rationale for using the en bane procedure. Further 
evidence of judicial dissatisfaction with the procedure is found in Judge Mansfield's 
concurring opinion in Eisen. He questioned the ability of an en bane court to resolve 
intra-circuit disputes. 479 F.2d at 1021. 
10. 314 U.S. 326 (1941). The Court looked to congressional history and the Act of 
Jan. 13, 1912, ch. 9, § 116, 37 Stat. 52, amending Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 118, 
36 Stat. 1132, and interpreted the three-judge provision of the Judicial Code, Act of 
March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 117, 36 Stat. 1131, as establishing only a minimum court size 
for a formal hearing, and not a limitation on the number of circuit judges who may 
hear and decide the case. 314 U.S. at 327-35. 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970). 
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framework; substantive guidelines on when to convene en bane are 
not stated, and the Supreme Court has held that a circuit court's 
exercise of its power to sit en bane is a matter of discretion: "[The 
statute] is a grant of power. It vests in the court the power to order 
hearing en bane. It goes no further , ... The court [of appeals] is 
left free to devise its own administrative machinery to provide the 
means whereby a majority may order such a hearing."12 
The Supreme Court, however, could not resist tinkering with 
the "machinery,"13 and it required that litigant requests for an en 
bane proceeding be considered by at least some of the circuit judges: 
"Counsel's suggestion need not require formal action by the court; it 
need not be treated as a motion; it is enough if the court simply 
gives each litigant an opportunity to call attention to circumstances 
in a particular case which might warrant a rehearing en banc."1' 
The Court's directive was codified in Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 35(b),15 under which litigants may suggest that a case is 
appropriate for an en bane hearing but may not compel members of 
the court to give their applications formal consideraton. A vote on 
whether to hear a case en bane is taken only if "a judge in regular 
active service or a judge who was a member of the panel that ren-
dered a decision sought to be reheard requests a vote on such a 
suggestion made by a party.''16 
12. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953), 
13. The Supreme Court had stated at length that Congress had vested complete 
administrative discretion in the courts of appeals, but it reached out "in exercise of 
[its] 'general power to supervise the administration of justice in the federal courts,'" 
345 U.S. at 260, quoting United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 589 
(1948), to impose "certain fundamental requirements" on the en bane procedure of 
the courts of appeals, including a requirement that the circuit courts provide some 
administrative machinery to handle litigant petitions. 
14. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 262 (1953). 
15. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are promulgated under the authority 
of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075 (1970), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1970). These statutes "give 
to the Supreme Court power to make rules of practice and procedure for all cases 
within the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals." FED. R. APP. P. I, Notes of Advisory 
Committee on Appellate Rules (found at 28 U.S.C. 7700, (1970), App.-Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure). 
16. FED. R. APP. P. 35(b). 
If a party desires to suggest a rehearing in bane the suggestion must be made 
within the ume prescribed by Rule 40 for filing a petition for rehearing [14 days] 
whether the suggestion is made in such petition or otherwise. The pendency of 
such a suggestion whether or not included in a petition for rehearing shall not 
affect the finality of the judgment of the court of appeals or stay the issuance 
of the mandate. 
FED. R. APP. P. 35(c). 
Precedent exists that may enable a litigant to convince the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari for the review on substantive grounds of a circuit court's decision to refuse 
or to grant an en bane hearing. While the Supreme Court has consistently voiced 
deference to circuit court discretion as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970), see text ac-
companying note 12 supra, two arguments exist for allowing review when the circuit 
courts fail to follow the policy guidelines of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35. 
First, in Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247 (1953), the 
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The substantive criteria for determining whether to review a 
case en bane are thus left to be defined by the rules and practices of 
the individual circuits, which also govern the procedural particulars 
of en bane review. Substantive guidance is offered, however, by 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a), which provides that "a 
hearing or rehearing en bane is not favored and ordinarily will not 
be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary 
to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the 
proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." 
Although Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 35(a) and (b) led 
to a decrease in the number of inconsistencies that had existed among 
the operational rules of different circuits,17 significant inter-circuit 
Supreme Court limited circuit court discretion by requiring the consideration of liti-
gant petitions. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. Although the Court did 
not require that the Ninth Circuit hold a rehearing en bane in the case before it, 
the "certain fundamental requirements" language that the Court used, see note 13 
supra, may be broad enough to reach the Supreme Court's reversal of an en bane 
denial. The second argument for allowing review is based on the Supreme Court's 
authority to promulgate the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See note 15 supra. 
The ultimate power to review interpretations of the rules should lie with the Supreme 
Court, and, accordingly, circuit interpretation and implementation of Rule 35(a) may 
be subject to Supreme Court scrutiny. Cf. United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216 
(1973) (involving FED. R • .APP. P. 58); United States ex Tel. Cerullo v. Follette, 396 U.S. 
1232 (1969) (involving FED. R. An. P. 23(b)). 
17. Wide variations in circuit court administrative rules mncerning en bane pro-
cedures existed prior to the adoption of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35. 
(These administrative rules have since been repealed. The old versions may be found 
in 28 U.S.C.A., App.-United States Court of Appeals Rules (Supp. 1967), amending 
28 U.S.C.A., App.-United States Court of Appeals Rules (1956)). The District of 
Columbia, the Fourth, and the Seventh Circuits had no rules dealing with en bane 
procedure. The administrative rules of the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits detailed the procedures for en bane consideration, but they provided no sub-
stantive standards for determining when en bane review would be used. 2d Cir. R. 25 
(repealed 1968); 3d Cir. R. 4(3) (repealed 1968); 6th Cir. R. 3(1) (repealed 1968); 8th 
Cir. R. 4(a), 15(e) (repealed 1968); 9th Cir. R. 23 (repealed 1968). The Tenth Circuit 
used en bane as a device to limit appeals of interlocutory orders under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) (1970). It allowed § 1292(b) appeals only with the permission of the entire 
coun sitting en bane. 10th Cir. R. 12(b) (repealed 1968). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit 
required en bane approval of appeals under § 24 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 47 (1970). 10th Cir. R. 13(a) (repealed 1968). Only the Fifth Circuit provided general 
substantive guidelines for en bane determination: 
A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may order that 
an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en bane. 
Such a hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered 
except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain 
uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of 
exceptional importance. 
5th Cir. R. 25a (repealed 1968). 
Following the promulgation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, the 
Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits rescinded all of their rules on en bane considera-
tion. The remaining circuits J?rovide for the en bane procedure in their rules, but for 
the most part the rules duplicate or refer to 28 U.S.C. § 46(e) (1970) and/or Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 35. See D.C. Cm. R. 14; 3D. Cm. R. 2(3); 5TH Cm. R. 12; 
6TH Cm. R. 3(b); 7TH Cm. R. 4(b); 8m Cm. R. 2(a); 9TH Cm. R. 12. 
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variations remain.18 Nevertheless, it is possible to offer a general 
outline of en bane procedure in the eleven circuits. 
The general practice is to distribute requests for en bane review 
to all active circuit judges, along with whatever supplementary 
information it is the practice of the court to provide, and to set a 
deadline for the submission of votes.19 Some circuits also circulate 
the requests among senior circuit judges and visiting judges.20 The 
additional materials that are routinely circulated vary, although 
judges are always free to request any available information.21 Some 
circuits circulate copies of briefs on file,22 and opinions (or prospec-
tive opinions, when a rehearing en bane is requested subsequent to 
18. For example, the role of the three-judge panel in adjudicating requests differs 
significantly among the circuits. In the Ninth Circuit the panel recommends whether 
or not a case should be reheard en bane. The other judges of the circuit may overrule 
the panel decision to grant a rehearing. In Banc Hearings, General Order No. 15, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2-5 (rev. May 14, 1969) (herein• 
after In Banc Hearings]. In the Fifth Circuit the three-judge panel may grant a 
panel rehearing following the receipt of a petition for rehearing, but it does not 
formally recommend action on the en bane question. Petitions for Rehearing En Banc 
Procedure ("The Pink Slip"), United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 8 
au1y 1972). The same procedure is followed in the Second Circuit, but the panel does 
not recommend action with respect to the en bane question. If a panel rehearing is 
denied, the result of the panel's vote is circulated with the en bane voting forms, 
Memorandum to Docket Clerks of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, Processing Petitions for Rehearing and Petitions for Rehearing Containing a 
Suggestion that the Action Be Reheard in .Banc 2 (Dec. 4, 1973) (hereinafter Second 
Circuit Memorandum]. The Third Circuit has no formal provision for notifying other 
court members of the panel's opinion on the suitability of a case for a rehearing. 3d 
Cir. Internal Operating P. §§ M-P (rev. March 1, 1974). 
19. See, e.g., Second Circuit Memorandum, supra note 18, at l; Telephone Interview 
with Richard Windhurst, Deputy Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, New Orleans, La., Feb. 5, 1974 [hereinafter Windhurst Interview]; Telephone 
Interview with Robert C. Tucker, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, St. Louis, Mo., Feb. 5, 1974 (hereinafter Tucker Interview]. 
20. For example, the Fourth Circuit circulates rehearing requests among the senior 
judges who sat on the panel that initially heard the case. Telephone Interview with 
William K. Slate, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
Richmond, Va., Feb. 2, 1974 [hereinafter Slate Interview]. The Eighth Circuit cir• 
culates rehearing requests to senior circuit judges and visiting judges who sat on the 
original panel. Tucker Interview, supra note 19, 
21. Several circuit judges indicated that the trial records of cases under en bane 
consideration could be obtained by request, although they are not routinely circulated 
in their circuit. E.g., Letter from Hon. Malcolm Richard Wilkey, United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to the Michigan Law Review, Jan. IO, 1974 
(hereinafter Wilkey Letter]; Letter from Hon. Bryan Simpson, United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. I, 1973 (herein-
after Simpson Letter]; Letter from Hon. Luther M. Swygert, Chief Judge, United 
States Cou~t of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 17, 
1973 [heremafter Swygert Letter]. 
22. Slate Interview, supra note 20; Telephone Interview with Robert Hecker 
Chief Deputy Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Denver: 
Colo., Feb. 5, 1974; Letter from William Luck, Circuit Executive, United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 28, 1973 
(.hereinafter Luck Letter]. 
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oral argument before a panel but before an opinion has been filed)28 
are often made available.24 Informal personal communication may 
of course take place among the judges,211 and a judge who requests 
that the court sit en bane may send a justifying memorandum to 
the others on the court.26 If a litigant requests an en bane court, 
and no judge in regular active service asks for a poll of the court, the 
request is summarily denied.27 If a judge initiated the request, or if 
a judge requested that a poll be taken in response to a litigant's 
request, the judges have a set period in which to vote. Failure to 
vote within the alloted time is considered a vote against en bane 
consideration.28 If a majority of the active judges on a circuit vote 
to rehear a case en bane, litigants may be permitted to file supple-
mentary briefs29 and to reargue orally;30 permission is granted or 
·withheld as a matter of course in some circuits,31 while others decide 
on a case-by-case basis.82 
23. This will ordinarily occur only upon the request of a judge, since it is unlikely 
that a litigant would request an en bane rehearing without knowing the outcome of 
his appeal before the panel. None of the 256 litigant petitions for en bane rehearings 
filed in the Seventh Circuit between September 1, 1969, and August 31, 1973, were 
filed after oral arguments but before a formal panel opinion. Swygert Letter, supra 
note 21. 
24. See Maris, supra note 5, at 93-94. For a four-year period between September 
1, 1969, and August 31, 1973, a panel opinion was available in all 256 requests for 
rehearings en bane in the Seventh Circuit. Swygert Letter, supra note 21. See also 
In Banc Hearings, supra note 18, § 2: "[A] panel should not ordinarily request a re-
hearing in bane unless and until the members of the panel have first expressed their 
views in the form of a proposed opinion or opinions." 
Circulation of prospective opinions is a common practice in many of the circuits. 
Kline Letter, supra note 3; Letter from Hon. Collins J. Seitz, Chief Judge, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 9, 
1973 [hereinafter Seitz Letter]; Letter from Hon. John D. Butzner, Jr., United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 5, 1973 
[hereinafter Butzner Letter]; Swygert Letter, supra; Luck Letter, supra note 22. 
25. Fifteen of nineteen judges who responded to written requests for information 
stated that personal communication is a factor in deciding whether to grant en bane 
review. See, e.g., Wilkey Letter, supra note 21; · Letter from Hon. David W. Dyer, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, 
Oct. 15, 1973 [hereinafter Dyer Letter]; Letter from Hon. Walter J. Cummings, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 
15, 1973 [hereinafter Cummings Letter]; Letter from Hon. Donald P. Lay, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 2, 
1973 [hereinafter Lay Letter]. 
26. This occurs "on occasion" in the Tenth Circuit. Letter from Tenth Circuit judge 
to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 2, 1973 (name withheld by request). 
27. Fm. R. MP. P. 35(b). 
28. See, e.g., Second Circuit Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2. 
29. This is the practice in the Ninth Circuit. Luck Letter, supra note 22. 
30. Oral reargument is allowed in the Seventh Circuit, but not the filing of sup-
plementary briefs. Swygert Letter, supra note 21. 
31. The Ninth Circuit always accepts supplementary briefs, Luck Letter, supra 
note 22, and the Seventh Circuit never allows supplementary briefs and always allows 
oral arguments. Swygert Letter, supra note 21. 
32. This is the practice in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits with respect to both 
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The major drawback of en bane review is its heavy cost in court 
and litigant time and expense. The availability of the procedure 
taps the court's resources in three ways. First, litigant suggestions for 
a hearing or rehearing en bane necessitate much fruitless consider-
ation of case records by all of the judges of a circuit. In fiscal year 
1973, for example, 135 suggestions were filed in the District of 
Columbia Circuit; only three suggestions resulted in en bane hear-
ings, but all required the attention of each circuit judge.83 Second, 
the grant of an en bane hearing or rehearing considerably lengthens 
the time required for the disposition of the case.34 A survey of recent 
cases in two circuits revealed that cases reheard en bane take ap-
proximately five-and-one-half times longer to reach final decision 
than cases heard and disposed of by three-judge panels, and cases 
initially heard en bane take approximately two-and-one-half to three-
and-one-half times longer than cases heard and disposed of by three-
judge panels.35 Third, en bane hearings occupy all of the active 
judges of the circuit with the adjudication of a single case. In the 
Fifth Circuit, for example, fifteen judges will hear a single case,116 
absent vacancies and visiting judges. If the court was not sitting en 
bane, those judges would be availaole to sit on three-member panels 
and consider simultaneously five separate cases. The burden on 
judicial time is especially significant at present, for federal circuit 
courts currently labor under very heavy caseloads.37 The average 
number of appeals filed per judgeship in the eleven courts of appeals 
supplementary briefs and oral argument. Windhurst Interview, supra note 19; 
Phillips Letter, supra note 3. This is the practice in the Ninth Circuit with respect 
to oral argument. Luck Letter, supra note 22. 
33. Kline Letter, supra note 3. 
34-. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to 
the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L REv. 542, 582-83 (1969); 
Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institu-
tional Responsibilities (pt. 1), 40 N.Y.U. L. R.EV. 563, 576-77 (1965). 
35. A survey was made of all cases heard by three-judge panels appearing in 
volumes 454- and 455 of the Federal Reporter (2d Series) for the District of Columbia 
and Second Circuits. The average time between oral argument and the filing of art 
opinion in cases heard by three-judge panels was 95 days in the District of Columbia 
Circuit and 50 days in the Second Circuit. The average time between initial argu• 
ment and filing of the en bane opinion in twenty cases reheard en bane by the District 
of Columbia Circuit between 1966 and 1972 was 533 days, or nearly 1.5 years. Five of 
the twenty cases lasted over two years. In eight cases that were initially heard en bane 
by this court during this time period, the average time between argument and the 
filing of an opinion was 326 days. The average time between initial argument and 
the filing of the en bane opinion in fifteen cases reheard en bane by the Second Cir• 
cuit between 1963 and 1971 was 275 days. The court required an average of 129 days 
to file an opinion in t:lvo cases that were initially heard en bane during this period. 
36. See note 2 supra. 
37. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ACCOMMODATING THE 'WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS: REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS I (1968); Carrington, supra 
note 34-, at 54-3-49; Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Ad-
ministration, 42 TEXAS L. REv, 949, 979-82 (1964-). 
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has tripled between 1960 and 1973.38 Several circuit reorganization 
proposals have been advanced as partial solutions,39 but all circuits 
seek to ease their load by making more efficient use of court time. 
For example, oral argument has been drastically curtailed in some 
circuits, and "the use of judgement orders and per curiam opinions 
has risen dramatically."4° 
Finality is also impaired by the availability of en bane rehearings. 
The possibility that the decision of a three-judge panel may be over-
ruled by an en bane court may result in routine suggestions for an 
en bane hearing by the losing party.41 If a rehearing is granted, 
continued litigant expense for preparation and presentation can be 
expected.42 
The heavy costs of the en bane procedure in terms of court time 
and litigant expense should establish a strong presumption against 
its use in most cases, rebuttable only by clearly demonstrable benefits. 
Seen in this light, the accepted rationales for the procedure, which 
not only justify the existence of the en bane power but also determine 
the situations in which it should be exercised, are insufficient. Their 
vagueness and overbreadth have brought about an excessive use of 
the en bane procedure. 
Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Textile Mills contains a 
classic statement on en bane power.43 After concluding that the 
language of the Judicial Code did not forbid the impaneling of 
en bane courts, he stated: "Certainly, the result reached makes for 
more effective judicial administration. Conflicts within a circuit will 
be avoided. Finality of decision in the circuit courts of appeal will 
be promoted. Those considerations are especially important in view 
of the fact that in our federal judicial system these courts are the 
courts of last resort in the run of ordinary cases."44 These points 
38. COMMISSION ON R.EvlsION OF THE FEDERAL COURT Al>PELLATE SYSTEM, THE 
GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDAlUES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: REc:oMMENDATIONS FOR 
CHANGE I (1973). Many cases are now decided without opinions. A list of such cases 
can be found at 492 F.2d 1237-48 (1974). 
39. E.g., AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 37; COMMISSION ON REvxs!ON OF 
THE FEDERAL COURT .APPELLATE SYSTEM, supra note 38. 
40. CoMMlSSION ON REvlsioN OF THE FEDERAL CoURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, supra note 
38, at I. 
41. See Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodat-
ing Institutional Responsibilities (pt. 2), 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 726, 729-30 n.246 (1965). 
42. The time needed for disposition of the case is considerably lengthened, see 
note 34 supra and accompanying text, and the lawyers involved in the case often file 
supplementary briefs and reargue the case orally. See notes 29-32 supra and accom-
panying text. 
43. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 334-35 (1941). See also 
Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1953) (Frankfurter. 
J., concurring); Comment, The En Banc Procedures of the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 21 U. Cm. L REv. 447,449 (1954). 
44. 314 U.S. at 334-35. 
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have been codified in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, as 
noted above.45 
The first rationale-that en bane hearings resolve intra-circuit 
conflict by establishing rules of law for the circuit-is based on 
several assumptions. First, the rationale implies that an en bane 
decision carries more precedential weight than a regular panel 
decision, and that it provides the judges of the circuit with a better 
guide for future reference.46 Also, the threat of a reversal upon 
rehearing en bane presumably restrains a three-judge panel from 
reaching a decision that is inconsistent with prior decisions of the 
same circuit.41 This "restraint" theory itself assumes that en bane 
rehearings are used, or may be used, to overrule aberrant panel 
decisions.48 
In practice, however, the power to sit en bane has not always 
solved the problem of inconsistent panel decisions.49 In a small but 
not insignificant number of cases an en bane court cannot produce 
a majority opinion.5° Furthermore, even a majority decision seldom 
ends disagreement,51 and the host of separate opinions that an en 
bane court often writes may obfuscate the court's holding,li2 Indeed, 
"[f]ailure to agree en bane may leave judges unwilling to respect the 
en bane precedent strictly in subsequent panel decisions,''li3 and the 
weight of a past en bane decision or the threat of future en bane re-
view may be ineffective against determined dissenters,li4 Accordingly, 
45. See text following note 16 supra. 
46. See Maris, supra note 5, at 96; Note, supra note 34, at 583. Courts often note 
that a decision was decided en bane when relying on it for authority. E.g., LaShine v. 
United States, 374 F.2d 285, 290 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. H.N. White &: 
Co., 359 F.2d 703, 711 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 
239, 247-48 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 982 (1966); Dykes v. United States, 343 
F.2d 337, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
47. See Carrington, supra note 34, at 581; Maris, supra note 5, at 96. 
48. "[D]eterminations by the courts of appeals in bane ••• enable the court to main• 
tain its integrity as an institution by making it possible for a majority of judges al-
ways to control and thereby to secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions •••• 
Without the procedure in bane it would be possible for different panels of the court 
to reach and apply in individual cases diametrically opposite conclusions upon 
important questions of law or practice." Maris, supra note 5, at 96. See also Eisen v. 
Carlisle&: Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1025 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting), revd. on 
other grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974). 
In the Third Circuit only an en bane decision may overrule a prior panel decision, 
3d Cir. Internal Operating P, § M (rev. March 1, 1974). 
49. See Carrington, supra note 34, at 583; Note, supra note 34, at 583. 
50. See, e.g., Frady v. United States, 348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1965). An appreciable 
number of cases have produced an equally divided court. See, e.g., Ramsey v. United 
Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969), revd., 401 U.S. 302 (1971); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), revd,, 393 
U.S. 503 (1969); Allegheny Corp. v. Kirby, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965). 
51. See Note, supra note 34, at 583. 
52. Id. at 583-84. 
53. Id. at 583. See also Carrington, supra note 34, at 583 n.187. 
54. For example, in Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 
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many judges list intra-circuit consistency as merely a secondary 
rationale for the use of en bane power.65 Judge John Brown of the 
Fifth Circuit supports this view and notes that since 1968 only 
three of forty-six en bane hearings in his circuit involved outright 
conflicts among prior panels, and only another four or five involved 
possible conflicts.56 Further evidence of judicial dissatisfaction with 
the en bane procedure as a remedy for intra-circuit inconsistency is 
found in Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle 
b ]acquelin,51 in which he stated: "If the recent history of en bane 
proceedings in this Court is any indication, ... an en bane hearing 
would result in opinions expressing diverse views, necessitating ulti-
mate resolution by the Supreme Court."58 Mansfield echoed this view 
382 U.S. 862 (1965), the court on rehearing held by a vote of 6-2 that a trial judge may 
proceed to trial on the basis of a hospital report certifying that an accused is com-
petent to stand trial, if the government or the accused fails to make a timely objection. 
Judges Bazelon and Wright argued that the trial judge had abused his discretion by 
not ordering an independent judicial hearing to determine competency. 346 F.2d at 
819 (Bazelon &: Wright, JJ., dissenting). In Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920 
(D.C. Cir. 1966), Judges Bazelon and Wright formed a panel majority and reversed 
a trial judge's decision not to hold an independent competency hearing. The decision 
is difficult to justify in light of Whalem. Judge Danaher dissented, arguing that the 
decision was contrary to the precedent established for the circuit by Whalem. 365 
F.2d at 926-31. Two years later, in Green v. United States, 389 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1967) 
(en bane), the court reaffirmed Whalem. Judges Bazelon and Wright again dissented. 
389 F.2d at 955. See also Note, supra note 34, at 583 n.122. 
55. Sixteen of eighteen judges who responded to a written request for information 
ranked the "exceptionally important" justification as the most important criterion for 
determining whether a case should be reheard en bane. See, e.g., Letter from Hon. Carl 
McGowan, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, to the 
Michigan lAw Review, Oct. 10, 1973 [hereinafter McGowan Letter]; Seitz Letter, supra 
note 24; Letter from·Hon. John Paul Stevens, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 5, 1973 [hereinafter Stevens Letter]; 
Swygert Letter, supra note 21. Only two judges felt that preserving intra-circuit 
consistency was the principal reason for exercising the en bane power. See Letter from 
Hon. H. Emory Widener, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
to the Michigan lAw Review, Oct. 9, 1973 [hereinafter Widener Letter]; Letter from 
Hon. Thomas E. Fairchild, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
to the Michigan lAw Review, Nov. 26, 1973. However, nine judges felt that preserving 
intra-circuit consistency was the second most important consideration. See, e.g., Letter 
from Hon. George E. MacKinnon, United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, to the Michigan lAw Review, Oct. 9, 1973; Butzner Letter, supra note 24; 
Letter from Hon. Homer Thornberry, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, to the Michigan lAw Review, Dec. 4, 1973. Seven judges listed intra-circuit 
uniformity as less important than at least two other factors. See, e.g., McGowan Letter, 
supra; Letter from Hon. John C. Godbold, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 29, 1973 [hereinafter Godbold Letter]; 
Letter from Hon. Roger J. Kiley, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, to the Michigan lAw Review, Oct. 25, 1973 [hereinafter Kiley Letter]. 
56. Brown Statement, supra note 3. 
57. 479 F.2d 1005, 1021 (2d Cir. 1973), revd. on other grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 
(U.S. May 28, 1974). 
58. 479 F.2d at 1021. 
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in Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre,59 stating that an en bane hearing 
would not effect a binding precedent for the circuit in other cases 
because of the vagueness of the standards controlling the case and 
because "our views would be expressed by a divided court."00 
The second commonly stated justification for en bane hearings or 
rehearings is the desirability of having all the judges of a circuit 
participate in a case of "exceptional importance.''61 Heavy workloads 
do not permit en bane consideration of all cases that provoke dis-
agreement. Therefore, judges do not normally vote for en bane hear-
ings each time they disagree or are likely to disagree with a panel 
decision. Only those controversial cases that are thought to deserve 
special consideration are heard en bane. 
One obvious problem with such a criterion is that the bulk of 
cases defy rigid classification; each judge has a different conception 
of an "exceptionally important question."62 Evaluation of a case as 
exceptionally important is often intuitive, 63 and it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict which cases will be considered exceptionally 
important by a majority of judges sitting on a court of appeals. 
Nevertheless, three notions apparently underlie the "exceptional 
importance" rationale. First, the participation of the entire comple-
ment of circuit judges is said to enhance the process of adjudication. 
A larger number of judges may be more likely to "represent a sound 
consensus about the values expressed in national law"64-in other 
words, more minds are better. 65 Second, a sitting en bane adds to the 
authority of the resultant decision by eliminating the possibility that 
a fortuitous composition of the panel determined the result.00 Third, 
59. 476 F.2d 806, 828 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield, J., concurring), revd, on other 
grounds, 42 U.S.L.W, 4475 (U.S. April 1, 1974). 
60. 476 F.2d at 828. 
61. See note 55 supra. 
62. Examples of what judges consider to be exceptionally important questions arc: 
change of an established rule of law, Widener Letter, supra note 55; novel substantive 
constitutional issues, Seitz Letter, supra note 24; Cummings Letter, supra note 25; 
novel criminal and civil rights cases, Letter from Hon. J. Braxton Craven, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 12, 
1973 [hereinafter Craven Letter]; constitutional issues involving civil liberties, Swygert 
Letter, supra note 21; and unusual applications of constitutional law and federal-state 
relationships. Kiley Letter, supra note 55. 
63. Most of the judges who responded to a written inquiry used subjective modify-
ing words such as "novel" or "unusual" to explain their examples. See note 62 supra, 
64. Carrington, supra note 34, at 562. 
65. "Hearings en bane may be a resort also in cases extraordinary in scale-either 
because the amount involved is stupendous or because the issues are intricate enough 
to invoke the pooled wisdom of the circuit." Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. 
R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 271 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added), 
66. See Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 
1968 WIS. L R.Ev. 461. The author suggests that voting blocks can be identified 
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en bane consideration of exceptional cases allows all of the judges to 
participate in cases of significant public interest and exposure.67 
Institutional harmony may be advanced by permitting judges to 
participate in important cases about which they have strong feelings. 
The first notion has inherent limitations. There is an upper 
limit-upon which judges do -not agree68-on the number who can 
function effectively as one court.69 Beyond some point the quality 
of debate may suffer and the decision-making process may become 
unwieldy. Moreover, it has not been possible to correlate a higher 
quality of decisions with a larger number of decision-makers.70 
The second aspect of the "exceptionally important" rationale-
that en bane decisions will be more authoritative-has two compo-
nents. First, in cases involving sensitive political issues71 or the 
on many courts of appeals, and he concludes that "an element of justice-by-lottery is 
inherent in the three member panel device." Id. at 481. 
67. "The Circuit Judges of the Third Circuit think that ••• [the en bane] procedure 
has been very helpful in maintaining the very high esprit de corps which they enjoy. 
For each of them knows that in any case in which they are seriously divided in opinion 
they will all have an opportunity to participate in the ultimate decision which the 
court is to make and which under the doctrine of stare decisis is to be binding on 
them in future cases." Maris, supra note 5, at 96-97. 
Dissatisfaction with not being allowed to participate in what a judge considers to be 
a significant decision can perhaps be detected in two cases. In Armstrong v. Board of 
Educ., 323 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cameron, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 908 
(1964), Judge Cameron charged that panel assignments in civil rights cases were manip-
ulated so that the results would generally agree with the views of a four-judge 
minority of the court. 323 F.2d at 359. In Eisen v. Carlisle 8: Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 
(2d Cir. 1973), Tevd. on other grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974), Judge 
Oakes, after emphasizing the "extreme importance" of the case, 479 F.2d at 1022 (Oakes, 
J., dissenting), stated: "Never to use the en bane procedure would tend to fragment a 
court of 14 or 15 judges into panels of three, enabling a given panel-which sometimes 
consists of judges not appointed to the particular circuit court-to determine cases 
for the whole court." 479 F.2d at 1025. · 
68. Of fourteen circuit judges who responded to a question on the upper limit 
of participation on an en bane court, seven felt that nine judges was the maximum. 
E.g., Wilkey Letter, supra note 21; Craven Letter, supra note 62; Lay Letter, supra 
note 25. Two judges felt that eleven was the maximum. Seitz Letter, supra-note 24; 
Stevens Letter, supra note 55. Two judges felt that fifteen was the maximum. Dyer 
Letter, supra note 25; Simpson Letter, supra note 21. One judge felt that seven was 
the maximum. Letter from Tenth Circuit Judge to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 2, 
1973 (name withheld by request). One judge felt that ten was the maximum. Godbold 
Letter, supra note 55. 
69. See Carrington, supra note 34, at 584. 
'10. "[T]he process of deciding the competing goals of the process, the culmination 
in an opinion, and the most telling procedures in regard to each of these differ not 
at all whether the bench be made up of three or nine, whether it be a panel or a 
division or a whole court." K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS 313 (1960). 
'11. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1973) (en bane), Tevd., 42 
U.S.L.W. 5249 (U.S. July 25, 1974) (the Detroit busing case); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 
700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane); United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (en bane), afjd., 403 U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. New York Times, 
444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.) (en bane), revd., 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Alexander v. United States, 
173 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1949) (en bane), revd, on rehearing, 181 F.2d 480 (1950) (en bane). 
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integrity of the judicial process72 the court may desire that its deci-
sion be as "official" and as widely acceptable as possible. Although 
some fortuity in result due to the chance composition of panels is 
accepted as inevitable in most cases,78 "justice-by-lottery"74 is patently 
unacceptable in cases that arouse deep public emotion or impugn 
the integrity of a branch of government. Second, in cases that will 
significantly affect many future decisions by determining major 
doctrinal trends-so-called "leading cases"-the court may seek an 
en bane hearing to reduce the risk that an aberrant panel decision 
will bind the full circuit to an unfortunate position. This argument 
may reflect the increasing law-making function of the federal circuit 
courts, which, due to the tremendous increase in judicial business, 
now perform a good deal of the national law-making that in earlier 
times would have been undertaken by the Supreme Court.711 In 
practical terms the courts of appeals are often national courts of 
last resort. 76 
These arguments assume that three-judge panels, in certain cases, 
have less ability than a court sitting en bane to issue legitimate, 
binding, and popularly acceptable decisions. However, panel deci-
sions have been accepted as fully binding authorities since the 
creation of the courts of appeals.77 It is hard to see why certain cases, 
usually singled out by judicial whim, would lack the necessary au-
thority if decided by panels. Furthermore, as noted above,78 en bane 
hearings do not necessarily result in definitive rulings. There are 
thus no compelling reasons to believe that en bane hearings more 
72. See, e.g., General Tire &: Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 373 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1967) 
(en bane) (writ of mandamus to compel a district judge to transfer a case to another 
court); Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 
936 (1966) (a district judge forced to withdraw from a case because of his relationship 
with attorney representing a party). 
73. See Goldman, supra note 66, at 434; Comment, supra note 43, at 449 n,12, 
74. See note 66 supra. 
75. See Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 
F.RD. 573 (1972). The study group concluded that the decline in the percentage of 
petitions for certiorari granted during the past three decades "seem[s] to reflect, not a 
lessening of the proportion of cases worthy of review, but rather the need to keep the 
number of cases argued and decided on the merits within manageable limits as the 
docket increases." Id. at 580. Many circuit court decisions have significantly affected 
national jurisprudence. E.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir, 1972) 
(en bane); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
76. "[I]n our federal judicial system [the courts of appeals] • , • are the courts of last 
resort in the run of ordinary cases." Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 
326, 335 (1941). See also P. Carrington, United States Civil Appeals, Report to the 
Administrative Conference of the United States 5, Feb. 28, 1973. 
77. See Carrington, supra note 34, at 581; Comment, supra note 43, at 448 n,3, 450. 
The en bane procedure is a relatively recent innovation, The procedure was not 
officially approved by the Supreme Court until Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 
314 U.S. 326 (1941). 
78. {lee text accompanying notes 49.59 supra. 
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authoritatively resolve sens1t1ve issues or more correctly dictate 
major doctrinal trends than three-judge panels. 
The final justification for the "exceptionally important" rationale 
-judicial harmony-deserves little comment. A judge's desire to 
express his views on cases of public notoriety or import does not 
justify spending the increased time and expense that en bane hear-
ings necessitate. 
The two rationales traditionally offered to support the use of the 
en bane power and to establish criteria for the selection of cases for 
full court review are thus of questionable value. Nevertheless, the 
en bane decisional format may prove useful in selected cases. Meth-
ods of reforming the procedure to limit its inefficiency may take two 
directions. First, the costs of en bane review-the increases in court 
time spent on individual cases and in expense to litigants-can be 
reduced by procedural modifications. Second, criteria for the exercise 
of en bane power can be developed to limit the use of the procedure 
to cases that offer tangible returns for the court time expended. 
Three circuit courts, apparently cognizant of the costs entailed 
by en bane review, have formally adopted procedures to limit its 
use. The Ninth Circuit uses an informal screening device: If the 
three-judge panel that is hearing or has heard the case decides ( either 
sua sponte or in response to a suggestion by a party or by a member 
of the court) that review en bane is not appropriate, other members 
0£ the court may acquiesce in that determination without conducting 
a poll of the entire court.79 This procedure reduces the number of 
judges participating in the decision to grant review and thereby 
lowers the fixed cost of maintaining the en bane option. If a judge 
disagrees with the panel's recommendation, however, he may still 
request a vote of the entire court.80 The effectiveness of the screen-
ing device is thus speculative; it depends on the deference afforded 
the panel's determinations by the other circuit judges. 
A recently adopted rule in the Third Circuit requires that a 
petitioner for a rehearing en bane file a statement documenting the 
possibility of a significant intra-circuit conflict or noting the issue 
of exceptional importance that justifies en bane consideration.81 The 
rule should make it easier for the court to identify clearly unmeritori-
ous petitions.82 It should be noted, however, that it applies only to 
petitions. Judges are not required to respond to the requests with 
written opinions. 
79, In Banc Hearings, supra note 18, §§ 4-5. 
80. Id.§ 5. 
81. 3d Cm. R. 22. 
82. Written litigant petitions serve functions very similar to those served by party 
pleadings. Pleadings provide the court with sufficient information quickly to dispose 
of unmeritorious claims. C. WRIGIIT, HANDBOOK OF THE I.Aw OF FEDERAL COURTS 283 (2d 
ed.1970). 
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Neither proposal attempts to redefine the criteria for the decision 
to invoke the power to sit en bane. The Second Circuit, however, has 
sought to amend the traditional justifications. The court declined 
to sit en bane in Eisen v. Carlisle b ]acquelin83 because of the likeli-
hood that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari.84 In effect, the 
court reversed the "exceptional importance" rationale by citing the 
importance of the case as a ground for denying a rehearing en banc.8G 
It stated that a rehearing would merely delay consideration by the 
Supreme Court and unnecessarily burden the court of appeals.86 
Although the Supreme Court did ultimately decide the case,87 the 
majority's technique prompted a vigorous dissent that noted the 
danger of speculation about the likelihood of certiorari in a given 
case.88 Under the current assumption that en bane courts are justi-
fiable in cases of exceptional importance, it seems unwise to base a 
decision on en bane review on an assessment of certiorari potential. 
If the court guesses incorrectly, it will have foreclosed review of 
exactly the type of case that deserves en bane treatment under 
prevailing theory. Furthermore, the workability of the "certiorari 
potential" criterion depends on the exercise of judicial self-restraint 
on a case-by-case basis. Such open-ended criteria have proved in-
adequate to limit sufficiently en bane review. 
On balance, the efforts of the three circuits are notable but not 
very promising: The effect of the Ninth Circuit's screening device is 
83. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), revd. on other grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. 
May 28, 1974). 
84. This approach had been hinted at in earlier opinions. See, e.g., .Doraas v, 
Village of .Delle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 826 (2d Cir. 1973), revd, on other grounds, 42 
U.SL.W. 4475 (U.S. April 1, 1974). There is evidence that the practice is followed 
informally in other circuits. See, e.g., United States v • .Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1850 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972) (McGowan & Leventhal, JJ., concurring) (denial of en bane rehearing}, 
85. Judge Kaufman, writing for the majority, felt that the exception did not subvert 
the "exceptional importance" doctrine: 
Our decision to decline en bane consideration of this case in no way implies ••• 
the demise of en bane in future cases of exceptional importance; nor does it 
threaten to tum this collegial court into a fragmented judicial body of panels of 
three, in which each panel's opinions speak only for the panel, and not for the 
whole Court. Instead, we wisely speed this case on its way to the Supreme Court 
as an exercise of sound, prudent and resourceful judicial administration. 
479 F.2d at 1021. Despite this assertion, all cases that are significant enough to com• 
mand Supreme Court review would seemingly be "exceptionally important." In deny-
ing those cases en bane treatment the court is framing a very broad exception, 
86. 479 F.2d at 1021. 
87. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974). 
88. It is said or suggested that this case is so important that it will surely result 
in a grant of certiorari. With all respect I do not know how we can be so prescient 
about the United States Supreme Court. It may decide that it wants to hear from 
other circuits, and have a more balanced view before it than what is now the 
Second's, before it grants the all powerful writ. The Court may decide that it 
prefers to postpone the issue until another day, for reasons of internal administra• 
tion or external policy. 
479 F.2d at 1026 (Oakes, J. dissenting). 
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at best speculative; the Third Circuit's requirement that litigent 
petitions be in -writing is a meager advancement; and the certiorari 
potential criterion of the Second Circuit is substantively inconsistent 
and effectively unenforceable. Additional means of limiting en bane 
hearings and rehearings to appropriate cases must be considered. 
The fixed cost of the en bane procedure-the spending of an 
inordinate amount of judicial time on a single case--can best be 
reduced by eliminating litigant petitions and instituting rigid panel 
screening. 
Litigant petitions provide little benefit for their drain on court 
time. In some circuits it has become common practice for the losing 
party to file a petition for a rehearing en banc,89 seemingly without 
regard for the directive of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
35(a) that en bane rehearings be reserved for exceptionally important 
cases and intra-circuit conflicts. The petitions are rarely granted,90 
and often the court does not even vote on the issue.91 Whether or not 
there is a vote, however, the judges must spend time considering the 
petitions.92 They are faced with an unnecessary dilemma: They must 
either consider the petitions in detail, which is an unwise expenditure 
of energy in light of the small number of petitions granted, or give 
them only pro forma review,93 which effectively renders meaningless 
the right to petition for en bane consideration.94 
Elimination of litigant petitions would require an affirmative 
89. Note, supra note 41, at 729-30 n.246. 
90. In the District of Columbia Circuit 135 litigant requests for en bane review were -
filed in fiscal year 1973. Only 1 rehearing and 2 hearings en bane were granted. Kline 
Letter, supra note 3. In the Seventh Circuit, 40 litigant petitions were filed during the 
1969 term; only 3 rehearings en bane were granted. Of 52 petitions in the 1970 term 
none were granted; of 70 petitions in the 1971 term 3 were granted; and of 94 petitions 
in the 1972 term 5 were granted. Swygert Letter, supra note 21. 
91. For example, 40 litigant petitions produced only 10 votes in the 1969 term of 
the Seventh Circuit. Ten votes were taken out of 52 petitions in the 1970 term; 10 votes 
were taken out of 70 petitions in the 1971 term; and 11 votes were taken out of 94 
petitions in the 1972 term. Swygert Letter, supra note 21. 
92. A litigant request for an en bane court is circulated among all of the active 
judges of the circuit, who must determine whether to ask for a vote on the request. 
See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra. Consideration of the request may involve 
reading briefs, the final or tentative opinion of the three-judge panel, and intra-
circuit memoranda. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
93. See Note, supra note 41, at 732. ' -
94. The case for elimination of petitions for en bane hearings may be less com-
pelling than that for eliminating petitions for en bane rehearings. En bane hearings 
are seldom held. "During my tenure on the court there has been no case initially 
heard by the court in bane, and I can recall only one such suggestion." Phillips Letter, 
supra note 3. See also Swygert Letter, supra note 21 (only five votes on en bane hearings, 
with one passing, held in the Seventh Circuit between 1969 and 1973); Kline Letter, 
supra note 3 (only two hearings held en bane in the D.C. Circuit during fiscal year 
1973). Litigants rarely petition for initial hearings en bane. For example, in the Seventh 
Circuit there were no litigant requests for en bane hearings between September 1, 
1969, and August 31, 1973. Only one litigant requested a hearing en bane in the Ninth 
Circuit during fiscal year 1973. Luck Letter, supra note 22, at 93. 
1654 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:1637 
change in the law. Either appropriate legislation must be passed by 
Congress95 or the Supreme Court must be convinced to alter its 
decision in Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Rail-
road,96 which requires that litigants' "suggestions" be heard.91 
A second method of minimizing the judicial energy spent on 
deciding whether to grant en bane review would be to establish 
a rigid panel screening procedure. Judges on the panel could, there-
fore, foreclose a vote on the grant of review.98 Final authority to 
order exercise of the en bane power, however, would remain with 
the entire court. The proposal would vest more authority in the 
panel than does the current procedure of the Ninth Circuit because 
it would not allow another judge on the circuit to overrule the panel's 
decision to forego a vote.99 Allowing the panel to perform this screen-
ing would free the other judges from the task of familiarizing them-
selves with each case in order to determine if a vote would be proper. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that decisional quality would suffer. 
In fact, decisions to deny en bane review may be better founded 
when made only by judges who, by virtue of their participation on 
the panel, are familiar with the merits of the case. 
The elimination of litigant petitions and the establishment of a 
panel screening procedure would conserve judicial time and energy. 
Neither proposal presupposes a change in the substantive criteria for 
the decision to convene en bane. However, as discussed above,100 the 
traditional criteria of "intra-circuit conflict" and "exceptional im-
portance" are too liberal in light of the burgeoning caseloads of the 
appellate courts. It may be more profitable to reserve en bane treat-
ment for those rare conflicts that involve the integrity of the judicial 
process. Cases that have dramatic political repercussions,101 and 
perhaps cases involving professional discipline,192 must be free from 
95. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § I, gives Congress the power to promulgate rules for the 
courts of appeals: "The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish." 
96. 345 U.S. 247 (1953). 
97. The Supreme Court could also eliminate litigant petitions by promulgating an 
amendment to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See note 15 supra. 
98. The Supreme Court approved of such a scheme in dictum in Western Pacific: 
"The manner in which [en bane] power is to be administered is left to the court 
itself. A majority may choose to abide by the decision of the division by entrusting 
the initiation of a hearing or rehearing en bane to the three judges who are selected 
to hear the case." 345 U.S. at 259. 
99. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra. However, this procedure would 
give the panel less authority than a discontinued Eighth Circuit practice that gave 
the original panel the final authority to grant or deny requests for en bane pro-
ceedings. See Comment, supra note 43, at 453. 
100. See text accompanying notes 33-42, 46-54, 61-78 supra. 
101. See cases cited note 'll supra. 
102. See, e.g., In re Ewers, 379 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir, 1966) (en bane). 
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claims of arbitrariness based on the constituency of the particular 
panel. En bane hearing-s, if restricted to these cases, will be few in 
number. 
Ultimately, however, the success of any efforts to limit the use 
of the en bane procedure must rely on the reasoned self-restraint of 
the circuit judges. Two procedural devices may contribute to deci-
sional rationality in this area. First, it may be useful to require a 
larger degree of consensus among circuit judges before en bane 
review will be ordered. Instead of the majority vote presently re-
quired under 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), Congress could require an affirmative 
vote of tw-o thirds. This would ensure that only the few cases that 
clearly merit consideration by the full court would receive it. Second, 
courts should be encouraged or required to state the grounds on 
which a case is granted en bane treatment. Explication would foster 
the development of a consistent body of principles and enhance the 
ability of the courts to evaluate the worth of the en bane procedure 
and to determine the situations in which it is appropriate. Written 
opinions would develop circuit court consistency and expertise on 
the en bane question by expanding the pool of information from 
informal personal knowledge to historical and inter-circuit experi-
ence. Written opinions in general add considerable rationality, con-
tinuity, and legitimacy to the decision-making process.103 Also, 
forcing litigants to submit written justifications for their petitions 
for en bane review (assuming such petitions continue to be allowed), 
as is the practice in the Second Circuit, makes little sense unless a 
body of principles has been developed that can provide a suitable 
basis for the litigant's arguments. If no adequate principles emerge, 
and if procedural devices to limit the heavy costs of en bane review 
are not implemented, then perhaps the en bane procedure should 
be eliminated. 
103. The deciding is, in the main, done under felt pressure or even compulsion 
to follow up with a published "opinion" which tells any interested person what the 
cause is and why the decision-under the authorities-is right, and perhaps why 
it is wise • 
• • • [T]he opinion serves as a steadying factor which aids reckonability. Its 
preparation affords not only back-check and cross-check on any contemplated 
decision by way of continuity with the law to date but provides also a due mea-
sure of caution by way of contemplation of the effects ahead. 
K. I.LEWELLYN, supra note 70, at 26. 
